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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The doctrine of the inchoate and general lien works hardship
upon lien claimants. Many commentators believe that it should be
removed by legislation as to both sections. In only one case,
United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), has the Court
held a lien to be specific and perfected. Kennedy, supra at 927.
Comparing the New Britain case with the Security Bank case,
supra, the impression is received that the standards of specificity
and perfection are more easily met by a competing lien under
section 3670 than under section 3466. Id. at 929. Amendment to
alleviate the hardship upon lien claimants seems desirable. It
might well be of the following tenor: the lien created by this
section shall have the same rank and priority as a corresponding
state lien has, provided that it shall have priority over and im-
mediately before the corresponding state lien. This would prevent
the very general defeat of the security of lien claimants occasioned
by the doctrine as currently developed while discouraging any
shaping of law by state courts or legislatures in behalf of residents
as against the federal government through the consequences which
would ensue for the state's own claims.
C. W. G.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFrrs-ELiGIBILrrY-R.E-
FUSAL To ACCEPT "NEW WoRie".-Claimants sought unemployment
benefits for a period in which a general work stoppage, resulting
from a labor dispute, occurred in the coal mining industry.
Claimants were coal miners with experience in that occupation who
either quit or were separated from their employment prior to the
general work stoppage. There was work available during this
period at claimants' former places of employment, but each claim-
ant stated that he would not have accepted a job there. Each was
a member of the United Mine Workers of America. Held, that
the work which each claimant "refused to accept" was "new work"
and that claimants were not disqualified for benefits since their
unemployment was not due to a stoppage of work resulting from
a labor dispute. Davis v. Hix, 84 S.E.2d 404 (WT. Va. 1954).
The controversy in this case resolved itself mainly into two
points. First, were the claimants "available" for full time work
during the period in question, and second, were they disqualified
because of "participation" in a labor dispute which caused the
work stoppage?
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W. VA. CODE c. 21A, art. 6, § 1 (Michie, 1949), provides for
eligibility for unemployment benefits if the claimant is found to
be "available" for work for which he is fitted by prior training and
experience. It has generally been held that an employee engaged
in a strike is not available for work within the meaning of unem-
ployment compensation statutes. Tucker v. American Smelting
& Refining Co., 189 Md. 250, 55 A.2d 692 (1947); Muncie Foundry
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. v. Review Board, 114 Ind. App. 475, 51
N.E.2d 891 (1944); Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corp., 193 Okla. 36, 141 P.2d 69 (1943).
But the West Virginia statute further provides in section 6, as
do statutes in many other states, that no work is suitable apd bene-
fits shall not be denied for failure to accept "new work" if the
position is vacant due directly to a labor dispute. Where a claimant
refuses to accept work vacant for such reason, he is still "available"
for work by reason of the legislative fiat that such work is not
suitable. Buckeye Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review, 161 Pa. Super. 594, 56 A.2d 393 (1948) (work offered
by employer, whose men including claimant had ceased working
because of a labor dispute; claimant not disqualified for benefits
by refusal to take such work after four-week-disqualification period
had ended). Although the words of the statute seem clear enough,
this is the only case found which rules as to its effect. See Bergen
Point Iron Works v. Board of Review of Unemployment Compensa-
tion Comm'n, 137 N.J.L. 685, 61 A.2d 267 (1948), and Miners in
General Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941), which
contained dicta ascribing to this type of statute the same effect as
the court in the instant case has given it. In Sakrison v. Pierce, 66
Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528 (1947), a similar dictum is to be found.
In order for a claimant to be qualified, the work must not only
be vacant for the above stated reason but it must also be "new
work". No cases were found which disposed of the problem of
what is "new work". The term is capable of different interpreta-
tions when being used as a criterion for determining an unemployed
person's duty to accept-or right to refuse-a vacant job. It could
mean work contrasting wholly in character with former work, that
is, of a new type as compared to one's former job; it could refer
to work distinguished from the former job only in chronological
sequence of time; the term could be said to mean any work other
than that offered by a former employer; or it could mean any work
which might be offered an unemployed person. The court held that
the term did not refer solely to work of a completely new type in
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a different industry than the one in which the individual had
theretofore been employed, but that it meant any work which may
be offered to an individual who has no employment relationship
with any employer. The court reasoned that to adopt a more
restricted meaning would frustrate the remedial purpose of the
statute in that it would make section 6 inapplicable unless the job
vacant due to a labor dispute was in a wholly different industry
from that of a claimant's usual and customary employment and
would thus greatly restrict the beneficial operation of the entire
unemployment compensation statute.
An applicant for benefits is disqualified under section 4 of the
statute if his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work because
of a labor dispute unless he was not "participating, financing, or
directly interested" in such dispute and was not a "member of a
grade or class of workers who were". In a prior case wherein the
claimants were employed up to the date of the beginning of the
work stoppage, the court had said, "If they [claimants] can satisfy
the director that they were not involved in any of the manners
specified in the act, then their ineligibility is removed.... The
burden plainly is placed upon the claimant by the showing that
the work stoppage exists because of a labor dispute." Copen v. Hix,
130 W. Va. 343, 349, 43 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1947). Noting that the
record in the present case contained no evidence showing that
claimants were "participating", the court held that because of the
fact that the employer-employee relationship had been totally
severed prior to the date of the beginning of the work stoppage, the
presumption of fault set forth in the Gopen case was not here
applicable.
To disqualify a claimant under section 4, whether through
his own "participation" or through membership in a "participat-
ing" grade or class, his unemployment must have been "caused by"
or "sustained in consequence of" the work stoppage and that work
stoppage must exist because of a labor dispute. Claimants' un-
employment in the present case was not "caused by" the work
stoppage, for it began long before such stoppage and there was no
labor dispute between them and their former employers. An em-
ployer-employee relationship must exist before there can be a labor
dispute between individuals and their employers. Thomas v.
California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 39 Cal.2d 505, 247
P.2d 561 (1952) (mill employees entitled to benefits after their
employment was terminated because employer had to close mill
due to strike of logging employees). The opposite view is expressed,
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but only by dictum, in Milne Chair Co. v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395,
230 S.W.2d 393 (1950), and in Block Coal & Coke Co. v. United
Mine Workers of America, 177 Tenn. 247, 148 S.W.2d 364 (1941).
The Thomas case, supra, appears to be the only actual prior holding
on this point.
Having thus determined that no dispute existed between
claimants and their former employers and that claimants' unem-
ployment was not due to any work stoppage caused by a labor
dispute, the court ruled that mere mutual membership in the
same trade union with the workers who were involved in a dispute
could not disqualify the claimants. The court reasoned that to
hold otherwise would be to automatically disqualify all union
members-no matter what the reasons for their unemployment-
so long as a strike by workers of the same union caused jobs to
be available which claimants stated that they would not accept.
B. F. D.
UNITED STATES-FEDERAL ENCLAVES-RESIDENTS AS STATE CITI-
ZEN.-Relators sought to strike D's name from voters' records and
ballot as mayoral candidate of South Charleston. D resided on
the United States Naval Reservation in South Charleston, a tract
purchased from the state but was not a federal employee. Relators
asserted D was not a state citizen and could not become a candidate
for office. Held, mandamus denied. West Virginia retains con-
current jurisdiction with the federal government and the state's
sovereignty extends to those purposes which do not interfere with
federal ,use of the property. The purposes for which the federal
government acquired the land have no relation to the right of
state citizens residing thereon to vote. Adams v. Londeree, 83
S.E.2d 127 (W. Va. 1954).
The case presents a clash of principle with precedent as to the
effect of the federal-state relationship on residents of federal en-
claves. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, clause 17, gives Congress the power
to "exercise exclusive legislation" over areas ceded to the United
States by the states. Older authority was explicit that "exclusive
legislation" meant wholly "exclusive jurisdiction" in the absence
of an express reservation by the state. Fort Leavenworth R.R. v.
Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S.
647 (1930) (state could not tax personal property thereon); Lowe
v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 Atl. 729 (1926) (residents not entitled
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